This article deals with 12th-grade students' conceptions of a mathematical definition. Their conceptions of a definition were revealed through individual and group activities in which they were asked to consider a number of possible definitions of four mathematical concepts: two geometric and two analytic. Data consisted of written responses to questionnaires and transcriptions of videotaped group discussions. The findings point to three types of students' arguments: mathematical, communicative, and figurative. In addition, two types of reasoning were identified surrounding the contemplation of alternative definitions: for the geometric concepts, the dominant type of reasoning was a definition-based reasoning; for the analytic concepts, the dominant type was an example-based reasoning. Students' conceptions of a definition are described in terms of the features and roles they attribute to a mathematical definition.
assertion that "although we frequently use definitions, we rarely focus on the nature of definitions. There is little agreement on what constitutes a good definition" (p. 33). Thus, one part of our study examines students' views and preferences regarding the roles and features of a mathematical definition.
When dealing with alternative definitions, we must take into account students' concept image and personal concept definition of the defined concept (Vinner, 1991) . By a concept image we refer to "something non-verbal associated in our mind with the concept name" (p. 68), such as a visual representation, a collection of impressions or experiences, or a mental picture. Clearly, a student's conception of a mathematical concept has bearing on what he or she will accept as a definition; a student is not likely to accept a definition that does not concur with the conception that he or she holds of the defined concept.
Therefore, in an attempt to address the issues noted above, the overall purpose of the study reported herewith was to investigate ways in which dealing with alternative definitions of given mathematical concepts, and related statements describing these concepts, may (1) elicit students' existing conceptions of a mathematical definition and of the defined concept; (2) support students' reasoning; and (3) stimulate the refinement of these conceptions.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The notion of a mathematical definition develops over the schooling years mostly through examples of definitions of many specific mathematical concepts. Students rarely discuss nonexamples of a mathematical definition, nor do they deal explicitly with the imperative features of a definition, let alone come across a formal definition of the notion of a mathematical definition. In this sense, the concept of definition is to some extent similar to the concept of proof. However, although many studies address students' or teachers' conceptions of proof (e.g., Fischbein, 1982; Hoyles, 1997; Knuth, 2002) , few studies investigate students' conceptions of a mathematical definition.
Students usually interact with examples and nonexamples of a concept hand in hand with the definition of that concept, thus constructing their conception of the concept (Wilson, 1990) . Over time, by accumulating this kind of experience surrounding different concepts, students form their conception of a mathematical definition, which consists of the roles and (imperative and optional) features of a definition. Students are commonly exposed to just one (usually a textbook) definition of a given concept. They rarely encounter alternative definitions, namely, a variety of examples of definitions for one concept, nor do they explicitly deal with nonexamples of a mathematical definition.
A nonexample of a mathematical definition of a particular concept could be a statement (describing this concept) that is not equivalent to its commonly accepted definition. For example, a common definition of an increasing function is: A function with a domain D is an increasing function on D if x 1 > x 2 ⇒ f(x 1 ) > f(x 2 ), for any x 1 , x 2 ∈ D. With respect to this definition, a nonexample of a definition of an increasing function could be: A function with a domain D is an increasing function on D if for any x ∈ D, f ′(x) > 0. To realize that these two statements are nonequivalent, one must employ logical considerations (similar to ways described in , for other concepts). Clearly, if a student holds the latter definition as a personal definition, he or she will not consider it as a nonexample of a definition. It follows that a personal concept definition may be either a mathematical definition or a nonexample of a mathematical definition, depending on the student's understanding. Hence, in dealing with examples and nonexamples of a mathematical definition, personal concept definitions play a critical role (Tall & Vinner, 1981; Vinner, 1994) .
In addition to inadequate personal concept definitions, nonexamples of a mathematical definition also rely on imperative features of a definition (van Dormolen & Zaslavsky, 2003) . Thus, if a statement is equivalent to an acceptable definition but does not satisfy one of the imperative features of a definition, it constitutes another kind of nonexample of a mathematical definition. 1 The imperative features relate to the following requirements: a mathematical definition must be noncontradicting (i.e., all conditions of a definition should coexist) and unambiguous (i.e., its meaning should be uniquely interpreted). In addition, there are some features of a mathematical definition that are imperative only when applicable: A mathematical definition must be invariant under change of representation; and it should also be hierarchical, that is, it should be based on basic or previously defined concepts, in a noncircular manner. Clearly, a statement describing a concept that does not fulfill the imperative requirements of a definition is a nonexample of a definition. In order to identify such a statement as a nonexample, one must hold these imperative conditions as part of his or her notion of a mathematical definition.
In addition to the imperative features mentioned on the previous page, there are features for which there is no agreement on whether they are imperative. The most notable example of such a controversial feature is the requirement that a mathematical definition be minimal. A definition is considered minimal if it is economical, with no superfluous unnecessary conditions or information. That is, a minimal definition should consist only of information that is strictly necessary for identifying the defined concept. For example, defining a rectangle as a quadrangle with four right angles is not a minimal definition, since it is enough to require that there be three right angles. Although some (e.g., Borasi, 1987 Borasi, , 1992 Hershkowitz, 1990; Vinner, 1991; claim that minimality is imperative, others (e.g., de Villiers, 1998; Pimm, 1993; van Dormolen & Zaslavsky, 2003) recognize the role of context with respect to the minimality criterion and accept, to a certain extent, some redundant definitions. Thus, what may seem as a nonexample of a definition to one may be an acceptable definition to another person, depending on varying conceptions of what is imperative in general, and on views of the ultimate need for a definition to be minimal, in particular.
Our aim in this study was neither to determine correctness of nor to try to reach a universal agreement on the definition of a definition, but rather to elicit the underlying considerations and perspectives that are brought forth in activities dealing with examples and nonexamples of definitions. Thus, within the framework of our study we designed an environment that stimulated discussions surrounding examples and nonexamples of definitions of various mathematical concepts (similar to Borasi, 1992; Lakatos, 1976) . This environment allowed us to identify students' conceptions of a mathematical definition. It also revealed how the general notion of a definition and specific concept definitions may interact, leading to more profound understanding of these constructs.
THE STUDY
The study reported here is part of a larger study addressing students' and teachers' conceptions of mathematical definitions (other portions of the study are reported in Shir & Zaslavsky, 2001 . This part of the study examined how students' conceptions of a mathematical definition, in general, and their personal definitions of specific concepts, are both reflected and developed through activities that elicit consideration of alternative ways to define a mathematical concept.
Participants
Four 12th-grade students participated in this part of the study: Erez, Mike, Omer, and Yoav (pseudonyms). The students studied mathematics according to the most extended curriculum offered in senior-high schools in Israel (called a 5-unit level of mathematics). The reason for selecting top-level students in mathematics was to allow an investigation of definitions of a wide variety of mathematical concepts, of various degrees of complexity and subtlety, for which a rather broad and sound mathematical background was needed. They were selected on the basis of their articulateness and willingness to devote time to the research activities. The group was diverse in terms of their achievement in mathematics within this top-level strand. Two were average students (Erez and Yoav) and two were outstanding students (Mike and Omer) who took additional extra-curricular undergraduate courses in mathematics at a nearby university.
Procedure
The study examined the students' conceptions of the mathematical definitions of four concepts: a square, an isosceles triangle, an increasing function, and a local maximum point of a function. Based on a preliminary investigation with teachers and students, four questionnaires for students were designed, all sharing a similar structure, although differing with respect to the specific concept at question. For each concept there was a sequence of three consecutive sessions. At the first session, each student replied individually to a written questionnaire. At the second session, which took between 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 hours, the students completed the same questionnaire as before, only as a group with no interference from the researcher. This session was videotaped and transcribed. In the third and last session, the students were asked to reply again to the same written questionnaire individually. Altogether there were 12 sessions (three for each concept). In order to allow the students to devote as much time as they found necessary to work on the task, there was no time limit set for any of the sessions.
Research Instruments
As discussed earlier, our study addressed several perspectives and considerations associated with the nature of mathematical definitions. The design of the research instruments took into account the potential of this wealth to enhance genuine mathematical discourse (as recommended by the NCTM, 2000, and implemented by Borasi, 1992, and Lampert, 1990) . The students' conceptions of a mathematical definition were examined through group discussions and written questionnaires that elicited their reasoning about and justifications for accepting or rejecting specific statements as possible definitions of a certain mathematical concept. As mentioned above, the group discussions were stimulated by four questionnaires of a similar structure, one for each concept (see Appendixes A, B, C, and D). Each questionnaire consisted of seven or eight statements describing its focal concept. For each statement, the participants were asked to determine whether they would accept it as a definition of the described concept. In addition, they were asked to choose the statement that they preferred as a definition of that concept.
In selecting the specific mathematical concepts for our research instruments, it was important to include some that are considered straightforward and some that are more complicated. The two geometric concepts-a square and an isosceles triangle-were rather simple and familiar concepts for which there was no doubt regarding how the students perceived them. The other two-an increasing function and a local maximum point of a function-were subtle analytic concepts of which students have been found to have different concept-images (e.g., Rasslan & Vinner, 1998; Vinner, 1994) . Consequently, for each analytic concept the collection of statements included, in addition to its common textbook definition, some statements that are equivalent to it and others that are not equivalent to it. The latter statements were designed as nonexamples of a definition, each reflecting a commonly held conception of the focal concept (see Appendixes A and C). On the other hand, the collection of statements designed for each geometric concept included only statements that were equivalent to each other. We assumed that it would be unlikely for students to select a statement that is not equivalent to their clearly accepted definition. Since we did not anticipate any differences in the commonly accepted definitions of these simple geometric concepts, we used these concepts as a trigger to deal with more general features of a definition. Thus, for each geometric concept the equivalent statements varied along a number of possible features of a definition (see Appendixes B and D) .
For the purpose of the study, we chose to address three central features that in our preliminary investigation proved to have the potential of stimulating reasoning about the roles and features of a definition. The first feature, which we discussed earlier, had to do with the minimality of a definition. In terms of this feature, some statements describing the two geometric concepts were minimal and some were not.
The second feature had to do with the form of presentation: A definition can be either procedural-by genesis, or structural-by a common property (Leron, 1988; Pimm, 1993; Rissland, 1978 On the other hand, a structural definition of a square relies on a property of the object (e.g., a square is a quadrangle, in which all sides are equal and all angles are 90°) or on a common property of the points that constitute the object (e.g., a square is the locus of points for which the sum of any point's distances from two vertical lines is a positive constant). The questionnaires for the geometric concepts contained both procedural and structural statements.
The third feature we addressed was the hierarchical nature of definitions. As discussed by van Dormolen and Zaslavsky (2003) , some concepts are related to each other in a hierarchical manner. In such cases, the definition of a concept may be hierarchical, that is, based on a more general and previously defined concept. We built on the work of de Villiers (1994 Villiers ( , 1998 and distinguished between levels of hierarchy (Shir & Zaslavsky, 2001 . For example, the following three concepts are hierarchical in nature: a polygon, a triangle, and an isosceles triangle. Thus, we can define an isosceles triangle as a triangle that has two equal sides. We can go one step back and define it as a polygon with three sides, two of which are equal. The further back we go, the higher the degree of hierarchy.
Data Analysis
In general, the methodology that guided us in our data analysis follows a qualitative paradigm according to which the research findings are obtained as a result of an iterative inductive process of data analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) . In our case, the findings were obtained by classifying and organizing the documented written responses and group discussions into categories that were not predetermined (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 1981) .
The data consisted of students' written responses to four different questionnaires-each administered twice individually and once as a group report, and of the four group discussions that were videotaped and transcribed. Students' answers included an assertion as to whether they accepted the statement as a definition of the focal concept, followed by a written response, composed of one or more justifications supporting the assertion. Accordingly, every response was divided into justification-units, each consisting of one justification. Altogether, students' written responses included 497 justification-units: 336 justifying the acceptance of a statement as a possible definition and 161 justifying the rejection of a statement as a possible definition.
Based on the coding scheme developed in our preliminary study (Shir & Zaslavsky, 2001) , we analyzed the justification-units according to the type of reasons provided for acceptance or rejection of a statement. Our analysis yielded 26 types of reasons (14 for acceptance and 12 for rejection), indicating three kinds of underlying considerations (the same as those identified in our earlier work (Shir & Zaslavsky, 2001) ): mathematical, communicative, and figurative. We elaborate on these themes later in the article.
The group discussions were divided into episodes according to the central issue that was discussed. Altogether there were 291 episodes focusing on 14 central issues (13 on task and one off task). The on-task issues were associated with various features and roles of definitions (e.g., questions regarding whether a definition must be minimal, whether it could be procedural, or to what extent it should be useful). Each episode was coded according to its central issue and its length of time. The frequencies of occurrences of each of the 13 issues were calculated by considering an episode as a single occurrence of its central issue. In addition, the total length of time devoted to each issue was computed. These issues were further grouped according to the three underlying considerations noted above (mathematical, communicative, and figurative), similar to the way in which the written justifications were classified, and correspondingly the frequencies and lengths of time of each type of consideration were obtained.
As we analyzed the kinds of justifications (written and oral) that the students employed, we noticed differences between their justifications for the geometric and the analytic concepts. This observation led to another analysis-a distinction between justifications that were based on examples and those that were related to general characteristics of a mathematical definition with no reference to a specific example. Finally, there were several cases in which a student switched from a (written) decision to accept a statement to a (written) decision to reject it or vice versa, after reconsidering the statement or discussing it with others. These shifts were documented and analyzed. The transcriptions of the group discussions provided additional explanatory backing for these shifts.
FINDINGS
In this section, we describe in detail the kinds of reasoning that characterized students' responses and discussions surrounding the consideration of various statements as mathematical definitions. We compare the kinds of reasoning used across the four focal concepts and examine the interrelations between students' group discussions and the shifts in their assertions. Through their reasoning, we identify students' conceptions of a mathematical definition and their development of understandings related to the notion of a mathematical definition as well as to the focal concepts. We conclude this section by analyzing students' shifts in their assertions, indicating modifications in their conception of a definition as well as in their understandings of the focal concepts.
Students' Mathematical, Communicative, and Figurative Considerations
We found that students employed two main types of considerations across all four concepts: mathematical and communicative. In addition, another kind of consideration was identified for the geometric concepts, which we term figurative.
Mathematical considerations are justifications involving logical concerns. According to this perspective, a statement was evaluated based mainly on its correctness, i.e., whether the condition specified in the statement is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the focal concept, according to the individual's understanding of the concept. Mathematical consideration also includes reference to both commonly agreed upon and controversial views of the imperative requirements for a definition.
Communicative considerations are arguments that focus on the communicative nature of a definition. According to this perspective, a statement was evaluated based mainly on its clarity and whether it is comprehensible and within reach to those who deal with it. This type of consideration deals mainly with optional features of a definition, which are mostly a matter of personal taste, and reflects the perceived role of a definition.
The third category of arguments, which we call a figurative consideration, has to do with the way the participants perceive a geometric object and its different components. People are exposed to squares and isosceles triangles rather frequently in real-life contexts, from early childhood. Thus, they are likely to conceptualize the technical mathematical concept of a square, for example, making use of their everyday concept of a square (Núñez, 2000) , which appears without its diagonals. According to this perspective, there is a distinction between the parts that seem integral to a geometric object (such as the sides and angles of a polygon) and those that are often hidden (such as the diagonals of a polygon); the latent parts are not equally considered integral parts of the object. Arguments of this category focused on the issue of whether it is legitimate to define a figural concept (Fischbein, 1993) by properties of its latent parts (e.g., congruence of its diagonals). Thus, this perspective is characterized by a reluctance to accept statements that are based on latent parts of geometric concepts.
2 Table 1 presents the distribution of the justifications given by the students for acceptance or nonacceptance of a statement as a definition for the four concepts, classified by their underlying type of consideration (for further analysis of the arguments into the different subcategories comprising each type, see Shir & Zaslavsky 2001 . The four mathematical concepts presented in Table 1 are organized according to the type of the focal concept: First the two geometric concepts and then the two analytic ones. As shown in Table 1 , although all four questionnaires were of a similar structure, the distribution of types of considerations depended to a large extent on the type of focal concept. For the analytic concepts, which were less familiar to the students and more complicated, students used mainly mathematical considerations (84%-89% of the justifications); for the more familiar geometric concepts, both communicative and mathematical considerations were rather frequently employed (39%-59% of the justifications). Similar findings recurred in the group discussions.
As indicated in Table 2 , the distribution of the number of episodes dealing with mathematical, communicative, and figurative issues is very similar between the two geometric concepts and greatly resembles the distribution of written justifications for these two concepts. A closer look at the time allocated to each kind of issue shows that for these concepts the communication considerations were dominant (72%-78% of the time). Additionally, the figurative considerations took 10% of the time in each of these cases. In fact, the relative "weight" of the figurative considerations is much higher, as it was applicable only to statements including latent parts (2 of the 8 statements describing a square and 2 of the 7 statements describing an isosceles triangle).
Unlike the findings for the geometric concepts, for the analytic concepts most of the time was devoted to mathematical considerations. The case of the local maximum was rather extreme (100% of the time involved mathematical considerations). The students spent this time trying, unsuccessfully, to reach an agreement regarding what a local maximum actually is. The participants were not clear on the full scope and meaning of the concept and thus were not able to move on to considering alternative definitions. In a less extreme way, this phenomenon recurred in the discussions regarding the definition of an increasing function. In this case, most of the mathematical discussions (i.e., 75% of the time involving mathematical considerations) were spent on debating what an increasing function is (or is not). Only after resolving this matter and reaching a consensus were they able to move on to considering ways of defining an increasing function, from both mathematical and communicative aspects.
Students' Example-Based and Definition-Based Reasoning
By example-based reasoning we refer to justifications that use examples to convince one's self or others regarding a certain assertion. Examples (or counterexamples) may be used to determine the boundaries of a concept or to support or reject a conjecture (as in Rissland, 1991) . The examples that the students in our study used were mostly counterexamples of concepts, which served to support the rejection of a statement as a possible definition of a certain concept. Examples of concepts or of concept-definitions were suggested only twice.
We turn to a written response illustrating how students employed example-based reasoning. In order to support his rejection of statement (a) in Appendix A as a definition of an increasing function, Mike used an example of the trigonometric function tan x and argued that "I don't accept it [statement (a)] as a definition [because, for example] f(x) = tan (x) is not an increasing function, yet at any point f ′(x) is positive." In this case, the function tan (x) is brought as a counterexample showing that a function satisfying the condition that its derivative is positive at any point of the domain is not necessarily an increasing function.
The following excerpts illustrate how students employed example-based reasoning in their group discussions. In the first excerpt, the students debated the 326 Omer used his example in order to explain to his peers why he thought statement (a) cannot serve as a definition. He used the example to show that the statement was not a necessary condition for a local maximum. Omer's example evoked disagreement between the members of the group with respect to their understanding (or concept image) of the focal concept, that is, a local maximum.
Students' Conceptions of a Mathematical Definition
In addition to example-based reasoning, another type of reasoning was identified, which we term definition-based reasoning. By definition-based reasoning we refer to justifications that rely on various features or possible roles of a mathematical definition. This type of reasoning was used to support both acceptance and rejection of a statement as a definition.
We now turn to a few illustrations of how students used definition-based reasoning in order to justify their assertions. Erez, for example, supported his rejection of a procedural statement (statement [h], Appendix B) as a definition of a square, by arguing that "a definition should not be given in the form of building instructions."
In the following excerpt, Erez used definition-based reasoning to try to convince his peers to accept a statement describing a square by its diagonals' properties (statement [d] , Appendix B) as a definition of square:
Let's see. What conditions should a definition satisfy? A definition should have no superfluous details, it should be accurate and correct, and you should be able to check things according to it. I believe that this statement satisfies all of these requirements.
This excerpt reinforces our claim that the group discussions led the participants (in this case, Erez) to articulate what conditions they thought (mathematical) definitions, in general, should satisfy, a typical characteristic of definition-based reasoning. Table 3 depicts the distribution of manifestations of example-based and definition-based reasoning among the written justifications. As shown in Table 3 , for all four concepts, other types of reasoning were employed at the most in 22% of the justifications. It is interesting to note that definition-based reasoning was the most frequently used type for all four concepts (in at least 54% of the justifications). Example-based reasoning was far more frequent for the analytic concepts (24%-29%) than for the geometric concepts (0%-1%). A closer look only at the justifications provided for rejection of a statement as definition of an analytic concept indicates that 78% of those for the increasing function and 71% of those for a local maximum were example-based.
The differences in Table 3 between the analytic concepts and the geometric with respect to the type of reasoning employed are closely connected to the differences presented in Tables 1 and 2 with respect to the underlying considerations that were applied. Although all example-based justifications reflected only mathematical considerations, the definition-based reasoning reflected all three types of considerations-mathematical, communicative, or figurative. In all three tables the distributions of the analytic concepts differ from those of the geometric concepts, yet the distributions for the analytic concepts are very similar as are the distributions for the geometric concepts. Apparently, dealing with the rather straightforward geometric concepts allowed the students to focus on the notion of a definition, whereas dealing with the more subtle analytic concepts led them to a process of monster-barring (Lakatos, 1976) , wherein the students iteratively modified their definition to better reflect the concept image they held.
As mentioned earlier, students' conceptions of a mathematical definition were elicited through their written responses and their verbal reasoning. In the group discussions, and with no interference of the researcher, students began to realize that they had diverse opinions regarding the crucial conditions that a definition must satisfy. As a result, a number of questions in relation to the conception of a definition arose implicitly, of which eight seemed particularly interesting. Due to the design of the specific tasks for each concept (as described earlier), some questions occurred in all the discussions (see vi and vii below), whereas others were more naturally related to the geometric concepts (see i-v below). We now elaborate on each question and present excerpts exemplifying the different views expressed by the students with respect to these questions. Note that they distinguished between the legitimacy of a nonminimal definition and their personal preferences regarding such definition.
ii. May a set of procedures for building a mathematical object serve as a basis for its definition (i.e., may a definition be procedural)?
The students were not willing to accept a procedural statement as a mathematical definition. The following excerpt conveys the group's consensus regarding whether it is legitimate for a definition to be procedural, with reference to the statement describing a square in a procedural manner (statement [h], Appendix B).
Erez:
Statement (h) [a procedural definition of a square] is a guideline regarding how to build a square.
Mike:
No way, (h) is too long.
Yoav:
It's an instruction, it's notErez:
[ It is interesting to note that the two procedural statements, one describing a square (statement [h], Appendix B) and the other describing an isosceles triangle (state-ment [g], Appendix D), were the only statements on which all four participants agreed immediately. For both geometric concepts, the students unanimously rejected the procedural definitions and argued that guidelines for constructing an object could not serve as a definition. Because procedural definitions are not very common in high school mathematics textbooks, it is likely that the participants had never come across a procedural definition before. Indeed, in a follow-up discussion with the four students, they each claimed that they had never seen a procedural definition in mathematics. Thus, a procedural definition was obviously not part of their concept image of a definition. Similar findings were reported with respect to mathematics teachers (Shir & Zaslavsky, 2001 ). Thus, the inclination to reject procedural definitions is connected to common classroom practice.
iii. May any concept serve as a basis for a definition of another mathematical concept?
According to the students, mathematical definitions should be based, when possible, on simple, familiar, and clear concepts. The students shared the opinion that there is no need to go back to concepts that are too basic. However, they differed in their views regarding which concepts should be considered too basic. Statements Actually, a square is a special rectangle or a special rhombus, so you can define it using those concepts.
Erez:
There's no doubt that it is true; indeed it is correct. But a definition, according to its nature, should be based on the lowest base.
Yoav:
You can say [it's a] polygon.
Erez:
Yes, a polygon with four sides.
A similar debate occurred when the students discussed statements describing an isosceles triangle. The following excerpt deals with the question of what they thought an "overly basic" concept would be, with reference to statements describing an isosceles triangle as a closed path of connected lines (statement [f], Appendix D):
Yoav:
A three-sided polygon is still normal, but a closed path of connected lines . Although the students agreed in principle that a mathematical definition should be based on basic concepts, they were never able to agree on what a "basic concept" is, nor on what should be considered a concept that is "overly basic."
iv. May any "correct" statement that is a necessary and sufficient condition of a concept serve as a definition?
According to the students, in order to qualify as a possible definition of a certain concept, a statement must be "correct" in that it must be a necessary and sufficient condition for the concept. However, they maintained that being "correct" was not enough for the statement to be accepted as a definition. The group agreed, for example, that the statement describing a square as a parallelogram satisfying a certain condition (statement [c], Appendix B) was a correct statement, yet they did not agree on the acceptance of it as a definition:
Yoav:
We Since Erez gave an example of a correct statement that the others did not accept as a definition, he managed to convince them all that the correctness of a statement is not enough for it to serve as a mathematical definition. Although the students did not address the issue of equivalence directly, from their reasoning it is clear that their position was that the criterion of equivalence is insufficient for acceptance of a definition.
v. May properties of any part of a geometric object serve as a basis for its definition?
In considering a statement describing a square by certain properties of its diagonals (statement [d] , Appendix B), the group debated over the legitimacy of defining a geometric concept (e.g., a square) by properties of its latent parts: So equal sides and right angles, they are also properties. Omer: No, they are a definition.
Mike:
Right, sides are sides. They build the square. Sides and angles build the square. Diagonals don't build the square.
Mike did not agree to accept statement (d) as a definition, whereas Omer, Erez and Yoav agreed to accept it, although they preferred other statements. They decided to leave it at that point and go back to it later, at which time Erez managed to convince Mike to accept statement (d), on the grounds that it was correct and relied on a basic concept (a quadrangle).
When dealing with a similar statement (statement [c], Appendix D) describing an isosceles triangle based on properties of its latent parts (the medians, in this case), Omer and Yoav began to change their minds. In fact, they shifted from agreement with Erez to agreement with Mike's standpoint. That is, they now felt that it may be a problem to use properties of latent parts in a definition.
Omer: It's an indirect property of an isosceles triangle.
Erez:
What do you mean by indirect property? Sides and angles are also indirect properties of an isosceles triangle, aren't they?
Yoav:
No, they aren't an indirect property, because . . .
Erez:
[Interrupts] You need to draw the medians in addition [to the figure itself], and that's why I only accept it but don't prefer it. But it's still a definition. Omer: No, no, no, no. This is a property that just happens to exist. When you say isosceles triangle, it's a triangle with two equal sides. It's irrelevant that other things are inside of it.
In a circle, for example, the radius is also a part that's inside of it. Omer: What? Erez:
In a circle I also didn't draw the radius, although I can define it this way [based on the radius]. In the same way, in a triangle I didn't draw the medians, but I can still define it this way [based on the medians]. What bothers you is that they describe it with something that you can't see. Omer: Sort of . . . it's an indirect property. This is an example of an issue on which the four students were not able to reach an agreement. Although Erez accepted the statement as a definition, the others did not, because they thought a definition should not be based on "indirect properties," that is, on properties of latent parts of the figure.
According to the theory of figural concepts (Fischbein, 1993; Marriotti & Fischbein, 1997) , geometric concepts have a dual nature and are composed of both figural and conceptual aspects. Although these two aspects should interact harmoniously, often one of the two aspects appears independently. In our case, the square and the isosceles triangle have figural characteristics that are derived from their shape. These figural characteristics include equal sides and right angles in the case of the square and two equal sides and two equal angles in the case of the isosceles triangle. Since the figural prototypes of a square and isosceles triangle do not include their latent parts, presenting students with a definition that is based on properties of their latent parts seemed to evoke a conflict. We must keep in mind that the drawing is not the geometrical figure itself, but a graphical or a concrete, material embodiment of it. . . . The geometrical figure itself is only the corresponding idea that is the abstract, idealized, purified figural entity, strictly determined by its definition. (Fischbein, 1993, p. 149) Confronting people with a possible new definition of a figural concept that they have already constructed in their minds creates a reversed process, in which the definition is judged by the extent to which it corresponds with the figural aspects of the concept. The above students' discussions are manifestations of this phenomenon.
vi. Can there be more than one definition of a mathematical concept?
At first all four students agreed that a mathematical concept may have several (equivalent) definitions. Later on, in the course of their subsequent discussions, one of them began to question this assertion. The following excerpt, taken from the first activity (surrounding different statements describing an increasing function), demonstrates their initial standpoint. The students discussed the question of which of two equivalent statements (statements [b] and [d] , Appendix A) to accept as a definition:
Erez:
We can decide that both are definitions. A definition is not necessarily one specific thing. Who says a definition is unique? Maybe we can define . . .
Yoav:
[Interrupts] You can define this in both ways.
Mike:
Truthfully, it's better to have them both. As the discussions progressed, and they dealt with other concepts as well as with the requirements of a mathematical definition, Omer began doubting the possibility of accepting more than one definition. He then tended to accept as definition only the "best" statement-the one he thought fulfilled all the imperative requirements-and treated all other equivalent statements as theorems. Toward the very end of their discussions, Erez and Yoav managed to convince Omer that it is possible, after all, to have several definitions to a mathematical concept. As Erez concluded, "I'm sure that a number of [possible] definitions were brought to the 'definition committee,' and they said 'we accept this and that, but prefer this and that.' " vii. What are the roles of a definition? Throughout the group discussions, mainly in the form of what we described as definition-based reasoning, the students referred to several roles they attributed to mathematical definitions. One particular role of a mathematical definition, namely, its role in classification of examples and nonexamples of a concept, came up in several cases during the group discussion. For example, when dealing with the definition of an increasing function (statement [b] , Appendix A), the students pointed to its power in "refuting functions," that is, in identifying nonexamples of an increasing function. In contrast, they referred to its limitation in proving that a certain function is an increasing function. This distinction was enhanced by the necessity that the conditions of the definition be satisfied by every two points. Clearly, it seemed easier for them to find a pair of points and show that they did not satisfy the required condition than to prove that any two points did.
The recurring reference to the role of definitions was reflected also when the students dealt with the different ways of defining a square (see Appendix B). Yoav's explanation for why he thought that statement (h) is not a definition was this: "It's not a definition because you can't check if something is a square according to this statement." Similarly, Erez, who argued that statement (d) can serve as a definition in contrast to statement (h), said, According to (h), if you get a certain polygon, you can't tell if it's a square, but according to (d) you can. This, first of all, disqualifies statement (h) and gives you a reason to accept (d).
In addition to the role of a definition in classifying mathematical objects, the students referred to other roles as well. In particular, they considered the usefulness of definitions for proving and problem solving and their contribution to understanding the meaning of mathematical concepts. For example, when dealing with different statements describing an increasing function, the students debated which of the two statements to prefer, the one describing an increasing function including many mathematical symbols (statement [b], Appendix A) or the verbal one with no symbols at all (statement [d] , Appendix A). The argument they brought up in favor of statement (b) was that the inclusion of symbols in the definition would probably be helpful in handling formulas and making inferences in the future. On the other hand, they claimed that statement (d) sheds light on the meaning and essence of the concept, thus is helpful in explaining the meaning of an increasing function. It should be noted that in the context of our study, we were not interested in determining which roles are more important than others. The main issue is that these arguments were raised and these roles seemed relevant to the students in supporting their preferences.
Students' Shifts in Their Standpoints and Understandings
As illustrated above, the group discussions elicited much debate and exchange of opinions among the four students, in the course of which they tried to convince each other to reach an agreement. As a result, there were several cases in which a student switched from a decision to accept a statement to a decision to reject it or vice versa. These shifts are an indication of the meaningful argumentation that took place and of the mutual influence between the participants.
As shown in Table 4 , every shift in a decision of an individual student regarding a certain statement from one stage to the following stage was counted. The number of shifts per student was either 4 (Erez, Yoav, and Omer) or 5 (Mike). The number of shifts per statement was between 0 (for statements [b] and [f]) to 4 (for statements [c] and [e] ). In addition, there were other shifts back and forth among the three stages above that did not appear in the written responses but were documented in the transcripts. Generally, the shifts portray individual differences between the students. The distribution of the number of shifts per statement indicates the extent to which the various statements lend themselves to evoking discussion and musing regarding the subtleties of a mathematical definition or the defined concept. Table 4 presents the students' decisions regarding the different statements describing an increasing function at three stages of the study (see Table 4 , note a). A similar analysis was carried out for the other three concepts. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of number of shifts in students' assertions per student according to the four focal concepts. It is interesting to note that every student shifted his assertion at least once for each concept. Additionally, for each concept there were at least 10 shifts reflecting a change in viewpoint or understanding. 
a The same questionnaire was given at three different stages: (S 1 ) the first time, prior to group discussions, individually; (S 2 ) the second time, at the end of the group discussion, collectively; (S 3 ) the last time, a week after the group discussion, individually.
A closer look at students' justifications (both written and oral) indicated two main kinds of shifts: (1) shifts reflecting (either temporary or stable) changes in the students' conceptions of a mathematical definition; (2) shifts reflecting (either temporary or stable) changes in the way students understood the focal mathematical concept. Table 6 (p. 340) presents the distribution of type of shifts per concept. As indicated in Table 6 , the shifts reflecting changes in a conception of a mathematical definition occurred only in the cases of the simple geometric concepts. Furthermore, the shifts in assertions regarding the more complex analytic concepts reflected mostly changes in the understanding of the focal concept.
Shifts reflecting changes in students' conceptions of a mathematical definition. As shown in Table 6 , shifts reflecting changes in students' conceptions of a mathematical definition occurred only for the two simple and familiar geometric concepts. The changes had to do with the issue of latent parts of a figure, the minimality of a definition, and the kind of basic concepts on which a definition should rely.
With respect to the latent parts of a figure, Omer and Yoav initially accepted definitions involving latent parts (e.g., the diagonals of a square or the medians of a triangle), but as a result of the group discussions they changed their minds and decided to reject such statements as definitions. Mike changed his mind back and forth, from rejection to acceptance, and then back to rejection of statements based on latent parts as definitions. The issue of what concepts may be considered basic enough but not too basic to use in a definition also caused several shifts. For example, Yoav and Mike were willing at first to accept a parallelogram or rhombus as part of a definition of a square but then changed their minds and decided that these were too "advanced" to serve as a basis. Other shifts were evoked by similar disagreement regarding whether a polygon could be a basis for the definition of an isosceles triangle.
At the beginning, Erez held the conception that a definition must be minimal. He changed his mind following the group's discussion, however, and from then on, was consistently willing to accept as definitions statements that were not necessarily minimal. We see that in the cases associated with the latent parts and the basic concepts, the discussions led some students to more restricted concept images of a definition, whereas in the case of minimality, Erez's concept image of a definition expanded.
Shifts reflecting changes in the way that students understood the focal mathematical concept. As mentioned above, the vast majority of shifts reflecting changes in students' understanding of the defined concepts occurred with respect to the two analytic concepts. For example, Erez's shift (see the first row of Table  4 ) regarding statement (a) (Appendix A), indicates that at first he thought an increasing function is a function for which at any point of its domain the derivative is positive. This is not surprising, given the overuse of this criterion to determine the subdomains in which a (differentiable) function increases. Only later did Erez become aware that this condition is insufficient for an increasing function. Omer convinced him of this by providing as an example the trigonometric func-tion f(x) = tan x that is not an increasing function, although the derivative is positive at any point of its domain. At first, Erez thought that tan x was also an increasing function. However, by applying the definition that they agreed on (statement [b] , Appendix A), he realized that it was not an increasing function. Thus, Erez refined his understanding of the notion of an increasing function, and consequently (rightly) changed his decision regarding the acceptance of statement (a) as a definition.
In another case, Mike changed his mind regarding statement (a) (Appendix C), from accepting to rejecting it as a definition of a local maximum. This change was triggered by the group discussion, in the course of which Mike realized that there were several kinds of examples of special points of a function that he did not consider examples of a local maximum although they satisfied statement (c). For instance, he did not consider as a local maximum a point where the function was not continuous, even if it was the "highest" point in the neighborhood (see example 2, Figure  2 ). Once he became aware of such cases, he drew conclusions from them that appeared consistent with his understanding of a local maximum. Consequently, he (rightly) decided to reject statement (c) as a definition, albeit for wrong reasons. In both cases, the students' shifts from acceptance to rejection of a statement as a definition of the focal concept was due to a change in their understanding of that concept. Erez reduced his example space of increasing functions by excluding examples such as f(x) = tan x and adjusted his personal concept definition accordingly. Mike became aware of a gap between his personal concept definition and his existing concept image. Similar to Erez, he adjusted his concept definition, although he did not seem to change his concept image.
There was a single case in which the group discussions led one student to make a shift that was not in a "mathematically desired" direction. When dealing with different statements describing a local maximum, Mike, Erez, and Yoav (wrongly) convinced Omer that continuity is a necessary condition for a local maximum. Consequently, he changed his mind and shifted from acceptance of statement (b) (Appendix C) to rejection of it. Only after rethinking about this issue on his own during the following week did Omer shift back to his original decision, which was mathematically sound to begin with.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our study examined four students' conceptions of a central metamathematical concept-a mathematical definition. 4 Their conceptions were elicited indirectly, mostly through their discussions surrounding alternative (acceptable or unacceptable) definitions of four specific mathematical concepts. Although the roles and features of a mathematical definition are not commonly addressed in an explicit way in K-12 grades (as confirmed by the participating students), in the context of these discussions the students referred spontaneously to most of these characteristics. This in itself is a manifestation of an indirect learning mechanism that supports the development of students' conceptions of a definition. Throughout the group discussions, we identified many instances of students' insights and turning points in their understanding of the concepts under discussion as well as in their understanding of the general notion of a definition. Thus, our findings illustrate both students' conceptions of a mathematical definition at a given moment and the changing nature of their conceptions. Figure 3 is an attempt to capture the dynamics involved in dealing with mathematical definitions.
As shown in our findings, the mere need to consider an alternative definition of a specific concept evoked interactions between students' concept images and their personal definitions of the defined concept. These interactions led to refinements of students' understandings of the defined concept. Once they reached a common understanding of the concept, their conceptions of a mathematical definition were evoked, challenged, and often modified. In the course of these deep musings, they employed, to a large extent, example-based reasoning, mainly as a vehicle to refine their understandings of the more subtle defined concepts (increasing function and local maximum), and definition-based reasoning when dealing with the more straightforward concepts (square and isosceles triangle).
Students' views of the features of a mathematical definition resonated with those of the mathematical community with respect to the tendency to use minimal definitions when possible and appropriate. Students were less consistent with the mathematical community with respect to the illegitimacy they attributed to procedural definitions and to those that are based on properties of a concept's latent parts. In addition, they did not fully appreciate the arbitrariness of choice of a mathematical definition, i.e., although from a mathematical point of view any one of a set of equivalent statements may serve as a definition, students were reluctant to accept some of the equivalent statements as a definition.
The students' views of the roles of a mathematical definition were reflected to a large extent in the students' communicative considerations. The students regarded a mathematical definition as a communicative device (similar to what Borasi, 1992, emphasizes) , and thus their expectation of a definition was that it be easily comprehended. It is interesting to note that the students referred to most of the roles of mathematical definitions that are considered significant by the community of mathematics educators. The need to state their preferences led them to evaluate different roles in order to decide which of them was the most important. The tension between coherence and usefulness was reflected, for example, in the debate surrounding the need for a definition to be minimal, since in most cases minimal definitions are most useful for proving, although minimality is often sacrificed in order to increase the coherence of a definition.
From a pedagogical point of view, the activity wherein students were asked to consider a number of possible definitions of different mathematical concepts is a powerful learning environment. The task design and setting created a rich and stimulating learning environment, in which the learners were motivated to interact meaningfully without researcher interference (contrary to the way Borasi, 1992 , worked with her students). The researcher's main role was to construct the initial task, which led to many new questions that were raised and discussed by the learners. This environment elicited a genuine need to convince one's self and each other, and consequently, to articulate well supported explanations and arguments (in the spirit of Yackel, 2000; Yackel & Cobb, 1996) . In addition to the cognitive value of argumentation, these kinds of discussions move students away from treating the researcher (or teacher) as the sole authority on what is right or wrong in mathematics toward relying on their own sound reasoning (as advocated in NCTM, 2000) . Moreover, by presenting students with the need to constantly generate relevant examples (including counterexamples) to support their own claims, such activities surrounding subtle mathematical concepts have the potential to create an engaging, natural site for students' to develop example-based reasoning. Generating examples is an important cognitive activity, as the ability to generate examples as needed is one of the distinctions between novices and experts and serves a main cognitive tool for experts (Rissland, 1991) . In addition, dealing with examples and counterexamples often presents learners with a cognitive conflict, the resolution of which may lead to modification of their knowledge (Lakatos, 1976; Peled & Zaslavsky, 1997) .
The group discussions that developed as an outcome of the request to consider alternative definitions can be viewed as a Lakatosian discourse (Lakatos, 1976) in the sense that they fostered gradual refinement of the students' understanding of the notion of a mathematical definition as well as of the defined concepts. Students' shifts (see Tables 5 and 6 ) convey this process by capturing the specific understandings that were refined and by revealing the steps in which this process developed (although, as mentioned earlier, the refinement was not always in the "desired" direction). From a mathematical point of view, the group activity involved challenging mathematics (Jaworski, 1992) for the students. The activity fostered students' aware-340 ness and appreciation of several critical roles and characteristics of mathematical definitions and allowed them to engage in a genuine mathematical debate. Mathematics is often regarded as a discipline in which there is always one correct answer for every (solvable) problem (Schoenfeld, 1989) , with no room for subjective views. This type of open activity (which in a way is similar to the approach presented by Zaslavsky, 1995) may be helpful in conveying a different view of mathematics-as a humanistic discipline, wherein results are socially constructed or rejected and are driven by personal values (Borasi, 1992; Brown, 1982; Kleiner & Avital, 1984) . For each of the four concepts there was a subset of statements equivalent to its common and familiar definition; this fact contributed to the humanisticdiscipline perspective by allowing for personal preferences, not just issues related to correctness, to play a legitimate role in determining what to accept.
Students' Conceptions of a Mathematical Definition
Finally, the ability to evaluate mathematical results and processes has been recognized as indication of higher-order thinking (Resnick, 1987 ). The highest van Hiele level of geometric understanding (Mayberry, 1983) involves the ability to compare deductive systems and theories. The highest level in Bloom's taxonomy (Bloom, 1956 ) deals with the evaluation of mathematical entities. Although it may seem rather implausible to incorporate in school mathematics situations that require evaluation of such a nature, the tasks that served our study proved powerful in motivating the learners to make personal judgments, to weigh and compare the merits of various potential definitions, and to evaluate them in light of their peers' ideas.
We conclude by pointing to some further directions for research. We investigated students' conceptions of a mathematical definition in a context that was free of the need to actually use definitions. Other aspects of students' understanding of definitions might be elicited in various contexts of use, such as problem solving that requires the use of definitions. In addition, we investigated a limited number of concepts, for which there is a general agreement within the mathematical community with respect to their meanings. The two straightforward ones were both geometric, whereas the two more complicated ones were both analytic. It may be worthwhile to examine a broader scope of concepts, including concepts for which there is not a consensus regarding their meaning (e.g., a trapezoid), or geometric concepts that are more complicated and analytic concepts that are straightforward.
